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Abstract 
 
 
The Urban Resilience and Chronic Violence project at MIT extends the scientific 
concept of resilience to the analysis of chronic conflict. This thesis builds upon 
the project by testing the usefulness of a socio-spatial capital resilience model for 
cities confronting persistent violence, which offers alternative strategies for 
thinking about a violence-resistant city. The first test of the socio-spatial capital 
model is through the analysis of resilience theory – how does the definition of 
resilience change in each discipline? The literature review concludes that the idea 
of stability is the foundation of any resilience definition, which is problematic for 
cities suffering from chronic violence. The second test of the model is the 
examination of violence in Karachi. Using the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) as a 
strategy of socio-spatial capital formation, the Karachi case study explores the 
relationship between the expansion of the OPP in the last 30 years and the levels 
and types of violence in Orangi, an informal settlement in Karachi. Lyari, which 
also suffers from violence and poor access to sanitation, is its comparison. This 
thesis finds that in both towns, residents have found innovative ways to cope 
with violence and poor development at different scales, therefore making both 
towns resilient. This thesis concludes by arguing that conceptualizing a city 
resilient against violence does not move a violent city towards peace, and 
proposes that the field of conflict transformation may be better suited to the 
study of chronic conflict than resilience. 
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Chapter 1. Urban Violence, Resilience, and Socio-Spatial Capital 
Just as language has no longer anything in common with the thing it names, so the 
movements of most of the people who live in cities have lost their connection with the 
earth; they hang, as it were, in the air, hover in all directions, and find no place where 
they can settle. 
-Rainer Maria Rilke, 1903 
 
1.1 Violent Cities and Urban Resilience 
 Henri Lefebvre’s “right to the city” has become a literal fight for the city 
(Lefebvre 1968). Massive rural-urban migration and increased life expectancy 
have drastically altered the socioeconomic and physical landscapes of cities, 
resulting in extreme stresses on urban labour markets, housing, and 
infrastructure. The city has been transformed into a microcosm of the nation, 
housing diverse groups of people in the same space, which has often led to 
battles for control over the city’s land and resources. While grand acts of violence 
have been traditionally enacted in battlefields, contemporary conflicts are now 
being waged in the roads and buildings of cities, recasting them as primary sites 
of global violence. 
 The shift in the unit of analysis in political economy from the nation-state 
to the city complicates the nature of urban violence. As Sassen (2002) writes, 
some cities have become key actors in transnational capital flows, creating a 
global network of cities linked by economic engagement. Cities are dislocated 
from their parent states, and yet continue to function as the most visible and 
prosperous symbols of nations. Urban violence thus spans the transnational, 
national, and city levels, all concentrated in the single metropolitan space.  
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 The Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence1 project at MIT 
recently applied the concept of resilience to the study of urban conflict in an 
attempt to elucidate how different cities respond to varying sets, time horizons, 
and scales of violence. What types of coping mechanisms exist, both formal and 
informal, at the state and community levels to combat conflict? Why are some 
cities more adept at dealing with urban violence than others? Can violence 
reduction strategies or pathways to resilience in one city be transferred to 
another? The urban resilience approach aims to cut through the various sectoral 
approaches to violence in order to develop a systemic approach to chronic 
conflict.2 
1.2 The Problem 
 While it is imperative to examine how people, communities, and 
institutions deal with violence, using the specific idea of resilience to understand 
urban violence may not be meaningful. The most common definition of resilience 
is the capacity to bounce back after a shock. This particular explanation of the 
word works well to describe the capacity of a system to withstand acute shocks 
and its ability to quickly return to equilibrium. However, this definition breaks 
down when the concept of resilience is extended to chronic violence. How can a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The author’s participation in the Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence (URCV) 
project at MIT under the direction of Prof. Diane E. Davis was a major motivation to write this 
thesis. The URCV project is funded by USAID and is interested in the idea of a city resilient 
against violence. The cities examined in this project are Johannesburg, Medellin, Sao Paulo, 
Mexico City, Nairobi, Kigali, Managua, and Karachi. The final report synthesizes insights from 
field research in each city when possible and theoretical approaches to violence and resilience. 
 
2 Different sectoral approaches to violence prevention and reduction involve revamping the 
criminal justice system, instituting good governance, engaging in crime prevention awareness, 
and expanding national security. The idea of urban resilience conceptualizes a multi-prong 
approach to urban violence that cuts through different sectors by focusing on the single city space 
where violence and citizenship are enacted. 
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city continuously affected by violence rebound to its status quo? What is the 
equilibrium state for a chronically violent city? Can a perpetually violent city be 
considered resilient simply because it still persists? A nuanced understanding of 
urban resilience is needed for the sake of thoughtful violence prevention and 
reduction strategies in the city – is the goal of conceptualizing a violence-resilient 
city to preserve normalcy or to move toward a different state with less violence? 
1.3 Socio-spatial Capital Model 
 This thesis explores how urban resilience can be adapted to the study of 
chronically violent cities. Specifically, this thesis will focus on the social capital 
resilience model, proposed by Varshney (2002) in his investigation of ethnic 
conflict in India. In his book, Varshney asks why some cities are more susceptible 
to ethnic violence than others, and finds that the existence of civic structures in 
communities explains some of the variation in the rates of ethnic violence. He 
argues that the breakdown of civic life in some Indian cities decreased inter-
ethnic engagement between Hindus and Muslims, while increasing intra-ethnic 
engagement, which led to ethnic violence. In Ahmedabad, for example, the 
decline of the Textile Labour Association and the unwillingness of the Congress 
Party to further invest in civic structures contributed to religious clashes, as 
compared with cities that have had strong community organizations like Surat. 
Varshney finds that most Indian cities with poor civic life suffer from increased 
ethnic conflict. 
 This thesis builds on Varshney’s analysis of social networks and 
institutional resilience and introduces the built environment into the model. The 
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existence of inter-ethnic social capital in one area explains why it is less 
vulnerable to ethnic violence. How do the spatial qualities of a neighbourhood 
affect its risk of violence? For example, is a dilapidated area in the periphery of a 
city with decaying infrastructure and poor accessibility more prone to conflict 
than a well-planned community in the heart of the city? Does the topography of 
an area affect its susceptibility to violent activities? This thesis uses Marcus’s 
(2007) definition of spatial capital to complement Varshney’s social capital 
approach. Marcus (2007) describes how spatial capacity and spatial integration of 
a place theoretically influences urban living. This thesis adapts the following 
definition of spatial capital from his work in order to qualitatively understand 
the spatial characteristics of a town and its relationship to violence – the degree 
to which urban spatial form supports urban social activities. This combined 
socio-spatial capital model thus examines both inter-group social networks in 
and spatial qualities of an area as drivers of resilience against violence. 
1.4 Introducing Karachi and the OPP 
 
Fig. 1: Map from Gayer (2004) emphasizes the complex geopolitical context of Pakistan. 
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 The case study chosen for socio-spatial analysis is Karachi, Pakistan. A 
historically global city (Anjaria and McFarlane 2011), Karachi has endured years 
of ethnic, political, sectarian, and terrorist violence, along with the more 
traditional types of conflict associated with a post-colonial, developing city. 
Violence in Karachi is enacted on four levels – international, national, provincial, 
and metropolitan (Figure 1). Pakistan has been suffering from conflicts related to 
trans-national Islamist terrorist groups and anti-Western sentiments post-9/11, 
which have played out in the city. Karachi has also dealt with the consequences 
of varying developmental patterns across the country and the region, which 
make the city an attractive destination for immigrants. At the provincial level, 
the urban, industrial city has had trouble relating to its rural hinterland of Sindh, 
and its cosmopolitan character has led to ethnic and language wars between 
ethnic Sindhis and other immigrants. Provincial politics and city politics often 
clash; the Muhajir3 Qaumi Movement (MQM) is supported by Urdu speakers and 
has a significant support base in Karachi, while its rival, the Pakistan People’s 
Party (PPP) has popular support in parts of Karachi and in the rest of Sindh. The 
Sindh provincial assembly is dominated by Sindhi-speaking politicians, and in 
areas where Sindhis are in the minority like in Karachi, people resent being 
governed by “the other” (Express Tribune archives). 
 Military presence in the city also complicates the criminal justice situation 
in the city. The Pakistan Rangers, a paramilitary force controlled by the national 
government, are often called into Karachi to help the police calm the city. 
Opinions on the Rangers, who usually guard the country’s borders, are divided. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Muhajirs is a term frequently used in Pakistan to describe Urdu-speaking immigrants from 
India. 
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In Karachi newspapers, some residents extol the mere presence of Rangers, 
which is threatening enough to ward off violent attacks. Others complain about 
the informal expansion of the powers of the Rangers to illegally assault residents 
and independently carry out investigations (Dawn archives).  
 In the midst of international, national, and provincial conflicts, Karachi is 
suffering from an urban crisis. It was unable to handle the massive influx of 
immigrants from India and the Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP) during the 
1970s and 1980s, which resulted in the creation of multiple katchi abadis 
(unplanned, informal settlements) all across the city (Yusuf 2011b). These katchi 
abadis have minimal links with state-based urban services, and residents in these 
informal settlements often rely on “urban specialists4” for access to water, 
sanitation, electricity, and land. Many of the economic sectors in the city are 
divided by ethnicity; for example, the Muhajirs dominate business while the 
Pathans are leaders in the transport sector. The ethnic enclaves found in the 
economic life of the city add another dimension of conflict to the urban crisis in 
Karachi (Figures 2 and 3). 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Anjaria and McFarlane (2011) draw on Hansen and Verkaaik (2009)’s idea of “urban 
infrapower,” which measures how quickly things get done in a city. “Urban specialists,” 
essentially the xyz-wallahs, work in both the formal and informal spheres to connect urban 
resources and services to residents. 
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Fig. 2: Karachi, the megacity, home to 15 million people. Photo from Martin Roemers. 
 
Fig. 3: Only 3 highways connect Karachi to the rest of Pakistan. The general perception 
in the city is that the Pathans, who dominate the transport sector, control the routes in 
and out of Karachi (Jaffri and Verkaaik 2011), illustrating a spatial dimension to the 
conflict. Source: Google Maps. 
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The different types of violence in Karachi, from ethno-linguistic to 
political violence, call for different approaches and interpretations of conflict. 
Varshney’s (2002) hopeful civil society hypothesis has already been mentioned in 
the formulation of the socio-spatial capital model. The author argues that inter-
ethnic conflict can be averted through institutions that build inter-ethnic social 
capital and thus decrease the necessity for intra-ethnic ties. Brass (2005) disagrees 
with Varshney. In his analysis of communal violence in India, he describes the 
“institutionalized riot machine,” which orchestrates violence all the way from the 
state to the informal settlements. These riots can be turned on and off at the will 
of the state, and at this level of violence, civic structures and social capital 
arguments break down as war breaks out across the city. The third interpretation 
of conflict comes from Ring (2006), who writes about everyday conflict resolution 
and negotiations in a multi-ethnic apartment in Karachi. Using the apartment 
complex as a metaphor for Karachi, the author describes a conflict resolution 
framework where the production and resolution of conflict is one method of 
creating social ties. In Ring’s (2006) model, conflict is inevitable but manageable, 
and does not necessarily escalate into violent confrontations. The Karachi case 
study will use the approaches of these authors to understand conflict and 
resilience in Karachi.5   
In this perennially violent urban landscape, Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan, a 
Pakistani social scientist, founded the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in 1980 in 
Orangi, one of 18 towns in the city that is often at the epicenter of political and 
ethnic violence. Leveraging existing efforts of residents to build sewer lines, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Wescoat (2007) provides more interpretations of conflict in India.  
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OPP provides technical assistance and helps each lane coordinate secondary 
sewer line construction (Hasan 2007). Using the internal/external concept, the 
OPP believes that residents need to take responsibility for internal sanitation 
(secondary sewer lines and house latrines) while the government focuses on 
building primary sewer lines and waste treatment plants (Hasan 2007). As of 
August 2011, approximately 90% of sewer lines in Orangi have been constructed 
and financed by the residents (OPP-RTI). 
 The OPP expanded in the late 1980s and early 1990s to provide other 
services, besides low-cost sanitation, in the area. The Orangi Charitable Trust 
(OCT) and the Karachi Health and Social Development Association (KHASDA) 
assist residents with access to credit and health education. The OPP is also 
involved in the mapping, documenting, and surveying of katchi abadis in Karachi 
to create a comprehensive map of existing water and sanitation lines in the city 
for Union Council (UC) representatives and engineers from the Karachi 
Municipal Corporation (KMC) and the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board 
(KWSB). Although the OPP model has been replicated (with OPP assistance) 284 
times in Pakistan, most of the efforts have been unsuccessful (Hasan 2007). 
 The OPP has successfully cultivated horizontal social capital between 
residents and has attempted to bridge the state-katchi abadi gap through its 
internal/external concept. The construction of sewer lines and latrines has 
cleaned up the streets, reducing public health and mobility problems in the town 
(Zaidi 2001). The OPP principle of including citizens in the building and 
financing of sewer lines is part of the larger idea of a collaborative approach in 
developing the built environment and building social capital in the process. 
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Healey (1998) describes how implementing a multi-stakeholder approach to 
urban interventions and recognizing and leveraging local knowledge is key in 
fostering good social networks and in creating a community. This approach, as 
followed the OPP, is especially crucial in a cosmopolitan city like Karachi with a 
weak state. 
Returning to the central question of urban resilience, this thesis examines 
how the presence of an inter-group civic structure such as the OPP and the 
improvement of urban services affected violence in Orangi. Lyari, a town in the 
center of Karachi, which also suffers from a paucity of urban services and an 
excess of violence, is used as a comparison with Orangi. Lyari is an example of 
an area that suffers from political and gang-related violence produced by Brass 
(2005)’s “institutional riot machine,” which complements the civic structure 
approach in Orangi. The comparison between Orangi and Lyari will explore the 
following questions: why does the OPP exist in Orangi and not in Lyari? What 
are the differences in the types and levels of violence in Orangi and Lyari? Are 
there comparable social capital-building institutions in Lyari? Do differences in 
spatial capital explain the differences in the levels and types of violence in 
Orangi and Lyari? 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 The following chapters draw upon both the theoretical literature on 
resilience theory and empirical studies on violence in Karachi and the 
externalities of the OPP to explore socio-spatial capital and urban resilience 
against chronic violence. Chapter 2 outlines the evolution of the concept of 
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resilience in different fields and points out some of the problems in using 
resilience to study chronically violent cities. Chapter 3 discusses the 
methodologies of examining violence in Karachi and the OPP, as well as the 
challenges in obtaining data. Chapter 4 delves into the history of violence in 
Karachi from 1980 to 2010, and looks at the spatial dynamics of conflict in the 
city. Chapter 5 looks at the levels and types of violence in Orangi and Lyari, and 
examines the effects of the OPP on violence. Chapter 6 attempts to bring together 
lessons learnt from resilience theory and the OPP to propose a shift from 
resilience to conflict transformation, which is better suited to the study of chronic 
violence.  
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Chapter 2. Resilience in Different Disciplines 
More and more I have come to admire resilience. 
Not the simple resistance of a pillow, whose foam 
returns over and over to the same shape, but the sinuous 
tenacity of a tree: finding the light newly blocked on one side, 
it turns in another. A blind intelligence, true. 
But out of such persistence arose turtles, rivers, 
mitochondria, figs -- all this resinous, unretractable earth.  
-Jane Hirshfield, ‘Optimism’ in Given Sugar, Given Salt, 2001 
  
Before bringing in resilience to the study of chronic violence in cities, it is 
useful to consider the origins of the word and understand how it has filtered 
through different fields. Can the concept, with its roots in mathematics and 
engineering, be transferred to sociology? How has each field modified resilience? 
How can some of the concepts raised in resilience theory relate to the study of 
urban violence? This chapter reviews some of the definitions used in 
mathematics, economics, psychology, ecology, urban planning, and disaster 
management.6 
2.1 Examples 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word ‘resilience’ comes 
from the post-classical Latin word resilentia or the “fact of avoiding.” In the 17th 
century, resilience also acquired the meaning of having the capacity to rebound. 
One of the earliest known examples of the usage of the word occurs in Sir Francis 
Bacon’s work, Sylva Sylvarum (1626). Bacon refers to the act of rebounding when 
he writes, “Whether there be any such Resilience in Eccho's” (OED). This notion !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Zhou et al. (2009) have provided a comprehensive list of different definitions of resilience. See 
Appendix. 
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of recoil emphasizes the pathway of the system back to its original state – how 
quickly and easily can a system recover? How long can a system resist 
exogenous shocks without being forced to change states?  
In psychology, this act of bouncing back from a shock is referred to as 
resilience (Tugade at al. 2004). In Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia (1915), 
although he does not directly allude to resilience, he describes the two paths the 
mind can take after a traumatic incident – after deviating from the normal state 
of mind, an individual can “work” back to normalcy through the act of 
mourning or veer off into the depths of melancholia. The latter poses an 
intriguing question about the general concept of resilient cities – are there any 
examples of cities that have veered off into uncontrollable violence and have 
transformed into a different system or do cities usually come back to some 
semblance of normalcy after a period of high violence?  
The OED also lists elasticity as a definition of resilience, which refers 
specifically to the quality and capacity of an object to resist change compared to 
the process of rebounding. This notion of elasticity is used in mathematics and 
engineering when describing the ability of materials or machines to bounce back 
to its original position and form after a shock. Bodin and Wiman (2004) point out 
here that in mathematics and the applied sciences, resilience and elasticity fall 
under the larger category of stability sciences, and the emphasis is on the 
stability of a complex system, or the capacity to remain at equilibrium despite 
being buffeted by exogenous forces. How a complex system responds to stress 
depends on the number of components in the system and the strength of their 
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interactions. The more components a system has, the higher its complexity and 
the higher its fragility (Bodin and Wiman 2004).  
This idea of mathematical complexity raises some interesting questions 
about the study of violence. The number of components in a complex system can 
be likened to sources of violence in a city. Karachi, for example, experiences 
many different types of conflict ranging from terrorist attacks by militant groups 
to gang wars to politically-motivated target killings to ethnic and sectarian strife. 
All these sources of violence are also strongly linked to one another. Political 
parties in the city are often formed on ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic lines, and 
depending on the triggers of violence, these parties attack different groups for 
different reasons. By comparison, the biggest source of violence in Mexico City, 
another area considered chronically violent, is the drug cartels. How should the 
number of agents of conflict in a city direct the scale of violence reduction 
strategies? Is it easier to tackle the problem of violence when there are only a few 
sources, like in Mexico City? How does the strength of connections between the 
sources of violence play into the levels of violence? Is it easier to find weak nodes 
in the expansive web of violence in Karachi and destroy them, hopefully taking 
down other nodes through a Domino effect, or is it easier to chip away at 
different levels of vertically integrated drug cartels in Mexico City? As an 
immensely complex system where every sphere of human life engenders some 
sort of conflict, how has Karachi managed to endure on the brink of extreme 
fragility? 
The usefulness of mathematical complexity in explaining stability in social 
and ecological systems led C.S. Holling to extend resilience into ecology. He 
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reframed the concept, moving away from a mechanistic, deterministic model 
with a single equilibrium point, to fit the existence of multiple steady-states in 
ecological systems (Bodin and Wiman 2004). Holling (1973) writes, “Resilience 
determines the persistence of relationships within a system and is a measure of the 
ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables, driving variables, 
and parameters, and still persist. In this definition resilience is the property of the 
system and persistence or probability of extinction is the result” [emphasis added]. In 
other words, Holling defines resilience as the capacity of a system to withstand 
multiple shocks without fundamentally changing into a new system.  
Holling’s (1973) definition involving multiple steady-states and the rise in 
prominence of the field of complex adaptive systems, the study of relationships 
between humans and nature, eased resilience into the social sciences. In 
economics, for example, a discipline obsessed with moving towards equilibria, 
the concept of economic resilience embodies both the return to steady-state or a 
new “normal” and the ability of an economic system to absorb exogenous shocks 
and still retain its normal functions (Hill et al. 2010). This dual definition allows 
economists the flexibility to work on different time and market scales. For 
example, when responding to an oil supply shock in the short-run, economists 
can try to bring oil prices or supply back to equilibrium while considering the 
overall capacity of the larger economic system to withstand and respond to 
numerous exogenous shocks over the long run. Not only can they determine 
how systems change over time, they can also investigate the changes in how they 
change (Bodin and Wiman 2004). 
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The concept of long-run and short-run shocks in economics presents an 
interesting question for the analysis of violence. One can conceptualize two types 
of shocks – episodic violence characterized by periods of peace separated by 
violent attacks (short-run shock), and chronic violence when violence is always 
in the background (long-run phenomenon). In a city experiencing chronic 
violence, it is useful to consider the relationship between acute violence and 
chronic violence, and the value judgments associated with each category of 
violence. Does the presence of acute violence make a society better off compared 
to when it experiences chronic violence? If effective violence reduction strategies 
make violence in the city less chronic (and thus more episodic), is this considered 
a sign of progress? Is working within the certainty of violence more conducive to 
the sustained operation of the city than infrequent, unanticipated acute episodes 
of violence? These are useful questions in thinking about time horizons in the 
study of violence, and how resilience can be defined in the short-run and in the 
long-run. 
The introduction of resilience in disaster management and environmental 
studies laid the foundation for conceptualizing a resilient city. In the face of 
climate change and global weirding, how can cities and communities protect 
themselves from acute shocks like natural hazards and chronic stresses like rising 
sea levels? The social vulnerability framework, often used in disaster planning 
and environmental management, explores the relationships between resilience, 
robustness, and vulnerability. For example, in Wutich’s (2007) study of urban 
water scarcity in Cochabamba, Bolivia, she describes resilience and robustness as 
opposites to vulnerability, where robustness is the ability to maintain functions 
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without adapting, and resilience is the capacity to adapt to shocks without 
moving to a different state. Here, she delves into the subjectivity of resilience, 
something crucial to the application of the concept to the study of chronic 
violence. Since complex adaptive systems can achieve multiple equilibria, 
resilience may not always be positive or desirable (Wutich 2007). Poverty, for 
instance, is a stable condition and is thus resilient, yet undesirable and not 
robust. Perhaps robustness may be a more selective and meaningful criteria for 
cities because any positive or negative reaction to a shock can be considered 
evidence of resilience, rendering the concept moot. 
Thinking about positive and negative (or criminal) resilience in the context 
of chronically violent cities provides some structure in directing violence 
reduction policies towards states of positive resilience, but also raises many more 
questions about the nature and desirability of states of negative resilience. An 
example of negative resilience is when a community is physically and socially 
isolated from the state but has access to basic amenities and livelihoods because 
it is governed by non-state armed actors like gangs and terrorist groups. Because 
the community is protected by these opposition groups, it suffers from less 
violence compared to other areas of the city. While this is negative resilience 
against violence, is it necessarily bad? Ultimately, the community is safe and has 
decent living standards. Is negative resilience an oxymoron? Perhaps the 
bifurcation of a concept that is intended to only have positive results should be 
defined more narrowly. 
Olson (2007) reflects on this struggle of using the concept of resilience to 
describe post-disaster community organization. In her case study of Hurricane 
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Katrina, she writes that most of the people and institutions affected by the 
disaster are not going to return to normal. Indeed, a new steady-state has to be 
found, incorporating the personal, social, and environmental losses caused by 
Katrina. In order to articulate this feedback loop, she re-defines resilience as “the 
generation of a capacity to adapt to a changed environment by continually creating 
new ways to cope with loss, access, personal or organizational resourcefulness, 
and invent protections against future vulnerability” [emphasis added]. Unlike 
Holling, she emphasizes the existence of coping mechanisms between states. 
Perhaps this position of thinking about a changing environment or system (even 
a continually changing one that characterizes chronically violent cities) is a better 
way to conceptualize urban resilience against conflict.  
Vale and Campanella (2005) further articulate post-shock adaptations to a 
changing environment. Using a variety of international case studies, the authors 
describe the importance of the narrative of resilience, while acknowledging the 
limitations of its “return to normalcy” definition. Figure 4 highlights the multiple 
ebbs and flows of coping activities during the post-disaster phase, recalling 
Olson’s idea of a changing steady-state. One of the axioms of resilience 
mentioned at the end of Vale and Campanella (2005) emphasizes the value of 
urban reconstruction as central to individual resilience after a shock. The authors 
refer to post-disaster urban redevelopment as “a highly visible enterprise that 
conveys an almost heroic sense of renewal and well-being,” and describe the 
value of architectural design and urban planning in recovering from the shock 
and in commemorating the natural disaster.  
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Fig. 4: One model of coping mechanisms during disaster recovery. Source: Vale and 
Campanella (2005) 
 
Simone and Rao (2011) continue the discussion of space in conceptualizing 
urban resilience. In their analysis of Jakarta’s political economy and 2030 master 
plan for the city, they advocate mixed-use zoning to cater to the city’s majority, 
as defined by the “in-betweens.” They argue that the key to Jakarta’s prosperity 
and eventual status as a global city is social, economic, and physical mobility, 
which should be reflected in the planning of the city. Essentially, the physicality 
of urban form needs to reflect the heterogeneity of the social space. Instead of 
segregating the slums from the urban megaprojects, the master plan for 2030 
needs to incorporate different classes and ethnicities equally across the space of 
the city. Spatial resilience for Simone and Rao is the capacity to best adapt to 
changing socioeconomic mobilities in the city through flexible zoning practices. 
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2.2 Is Resilience Meaningful? 
The various definitions of resilience in different fields emphasize that 
stability and the preservation of equilibrium are the underpinnings of resilience. 
This poses multiple problems for the study of chronic violence in cities because 
the equilibrium is not a desirable state. Further, in a city devastated by chronic 
violence, there may not be any time to recover from one shock before being 
affected by another, which makes even a flexible definition of resilience as 
envisioned by Olson (2007) and Vale and Campanella (2005) irrelevant. The next 
three chapters will move from resilience theory to an empirical study of Karachi. 
They will explore the relationship between socio-spatial capital and urban 
violence in Karachi to analyze the viability of resilience and to investigate 
possible alternatives that crystallize from the case study.  
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Chapter 3. Examining Violence in Karachi: Methodological Challenges 
The screaming wind transplants the soil/ particle by particle…/ All the forces of nature/ 
crowding man off his perch/ so that the land can return to its ways.// In this city of scarce 
sweet water and little rain/ each man protects his rood of greenery with panicked care. 
-Taufik Rafat, Karachi, 1955 
 
 Violence in Karachi and the work of the OPP in the midst of chronic 
conflict form the crux of the case study of urban resilience in the city. While this 
thesis is about exploring urban resilience against violence in theory and empirics, 
it is also an exercise in studying a violent city from afar. What kinds of research 
materials exist for desk research? How does one triangulate the truth when 
presented with a multiplicity of seemingly accurate but conflicting points of 
view? Secondary literature on urban violence in Karachi and the OPP is 
abundant, but the existence of and access to specific data like the number of 
deaths in Karachi or the number of sewer lines built by the OPP in a particular 
year is spotty. This chapter looks at some of the challenges of collecting and 
interpreting data about violence in the city. 
3.1 Data Collection and Analysis 
 When embarking on this project, the initial idea was to correlate the rates 
of violence in Karachi and Orangi to the expansion of sewer lines by the OPP 
from 1980 to 2010. Was the rate of construction of sewer lines lower during 
periods of high violence? The second part of the analysis involved comparing the 
levels and types of violence in Orangi and Lyari. Are water and sanitation-
related incidents of violence higher in Lyari than in Orangi? Does the existence of 
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a social capital-building organization like the OPP have an effect on violence 
levels in Orangi? This is the fairly idealized version of the project. 
 The first obstacle was trying to collect data on violence in Karachi. There 
are many international and local websites7 devoted to violence in Pakistan that 
offer numbers on homicide rates, number of deaths related to terrorism, gender 
violence, political violence, and sectarian strife. Unfortunately, the available data 
exists across different time and space scales, units, and topics. For example, there 
is very little aggregated data on violence at the city level for Karachi from 1980 to 
2010, although various websites, books, and journal articles provide some 
information on violence at the national or provincial levels over different periods 
of time. Of course, data at the town or town council level for Karachi is non-
existent.  
 Most of the websites and books devoted to violence statistics in Pakistan 
listed newspapers as their main source of information. Many of the online 
English newspapers, like Dawn and Newsline, have searchable archives so a 
database was started to address the need for city and town level information on 
violence with the help of newspaper searches. This was an arduous process, 
complicated by the diversity of reporting styles and techniques. 
 The Pakistan Criminal Records website and the book by Ahmar (2005), 
Violence and Terrorism in South Asia, proved to be enormously helpful in laying 
out the skeleton of the database. The website aggregates incidents of violence 
from different Pakistani English newspapers and tags each news article by city. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Examples of helpful websites are the South Asia Terrorism Portal, Citizen-Police Liaison 
Committee, and Pakistan Criminal Records.  
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Ahmar’s book painstakingly lists events related to violence and terrorism at the 
national level. Each entry is coded by city and includes information on the 
number of deaths, injuries, and material destruction, often cross-checked with 
newspapers and government reports when estimates wildly vary between 
sources. Ahmar (2005) covers violence from 1971 to 2004, while the website has 
aggregated news articles from 2008 to the present. The gaps in the years were 
supplemented by data from the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) 
reports and Dawn archives. The database does not contain information for the 
years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009 because reported data was either very poor or 
mainly descriptive.  
 Literature on ethnographic fieldwork in the city was very beneficial in 
understanding the social fabric of the city. Inskeep’s (2011) Instant City and 
Ring’s (2006) Zenana complemented the data collection and analysis process, and 
provided a social narrative for data derived from news reports. 
 It is important to note here that all of the written materials used in the 
sources were in English, which should be recognized as a limitation to the 
interpretation of violence from the dataset. Sindhi and Urdu newspapers would 
have adopted different approaches to the reporting of violence in Karachi. A 
further iteration of the dataset should include Sindhi and Urdu newspapers in 
enriching the dataset in order to best triangulate the insights gleaned from an 
analysis of newspaper reports on violence in Karachi. “Ground-truthing” the 
database and news reports with social survey research and interview methods 
are also warranted. 
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3.2 Dataset: Violence in Karachi, 1980-2010 
 The database created for this thesis contains 1,217 entries about incidents 
of violence in Karachi from 1980 to 2010. Incidents of violence in this thesis are 
defined as any event that causes human deaths, injuries, and material 
destruction. This period was selected to coincide with the start of the OPP in 1980 
and observe its expansion over 30 years. Each violent event contains the 
following variables: year, month, location in the city, type of violence, brief 
description of the event, number of deaths and injuries, commodity involved (if 
any), scale of destruction (neighbourhood(s) and city), and the source of 
information.  
 Locations were particularly hard to code because either towns or town 
councils were not mentioned in “citywide violent events” or incidents were 
reported according to the police station they were associated with. When 
possible, landmarks and police stations were checked with the CPLC website, 
Google Earth, and Google Maps to approximate the town.8  
 The types of violence are categorized according to the different sources of 
violence operating in the city. Figure 5, which is adapted from Moser (2004), 
summarizes the different categories of violence in Karachi and some of its 
manifestations.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 To further complicate the process, conversations with journalists and scholars in Karachi allude 
to the fact that towns share very soft and nebulous borders, and that people often do not navigate 
the city using towns and roads but landmarks. For this initial collection of data on violence in 
Karachi, however, the dataset still contains information at the town level. 
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Types of Violence in Karachi 
Primary 
Category of 
Violence 
Perpetrators and Victims Conflict Outcomes and 
Spatial Manifestations 
Political • State 
• Political parties 
• Political target killings 
• Conflict between 
armed members of 
political parties 
Institutional • Mediating state institutions 
(E.g. land, water, sewage, 
development and electricity 
agencies) 
• Informal institutions (E.g. 
NGOs, media) 
• Police and Rangers 
• Private sector 
• Citizens 
• Police encounters and 
custodial killings 
• Vigilante justice  
• People protesting 
against institutional 
and state actors 
• Attacks on police 
stations 
Economic • Gangs 
• Resource mafias 
• Robbers/Dacoits 
• Traders 
• Businessmen 
• Street crimes 
• Robberies 
• Kidnappings 
• Economic disputes 
• Arms dealing 
• Drug trafficking 
• Gang wars 
• Many land disputes 
occur on squatter land 
Ethnic • Ethnic groups (E.g. Sindhis, 
Muhajirs, Pathans) 
• Ethnic violence 
• Target killings 
Religious and 
Sectarian 
• Islamist groups 
• Sectarian groups (Sunnis v. 
Shias) 
• Attacking Christian 
buildings, Sunni 
mosques, and Shia 
imambargahs 
• Attacking religious 
processions 
Social • Families 
• Friends 
• Gender violence in 
homes 
• Disputes between 
families and friends 
• Gratuitous and 
everyday violence 
• Target killings for 
personal reasons 
Terrorist • Terrorist groups 
• International targets (E.g. U.S. 
Consulate, Sheraton Hotel) 
• Attacking foreign 
symbols (fast food 
chains, embassies, 
foreign workers) 
 
Fig. 5: A synthesis of the different types of violence coded in the dataset. 
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 The categorization of violence in this dataset might appear deceptively 
simple but it is one way of clearly understanding and presenting the major 
agents of violence in Karachi. For discussion purposes, they are presented as pie 
charts in subsequent chapters. However, the following diagram (Figure 6) shows 
some of the common combinations of violence that appear in the dataset, which 
illustrate the complexity of coding a single event. Each incident in the dataset is 
coded according to the primary source of violence, while the description contains 
more information on the secondary sources of violence and its socio-spatial 
manifestations. 
 
Fig. 6: Coding violence in the dataset was a complex process. The pie charts in this thesis 
focus only on the primary types of violence as identified in the newspaper reports. 
 
This dataset is far from robust. Crimes appear to increase towards the end 
of the 30-year period, simply because more data became available online. There 
are large gaps in the dataset because no information was available or incidents 
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were purely descriptive in the sources. Another major challenge in dealing with 
violence in Pakistan is that many crimes go unreported, which means that this 
database is a tremendous understatement of violence in the city. For example, 
Dawn reports that between January and June 2010, 1,175 women were affected by 
940 incidents of violence in Sindh but First Information Reports (FIRs) were only 
lodged for one-third of the events. The media will probably cover visible, large-
scale events like political riots and gang wars, but the everyday conflicts 
involving domestic disputes, robberies, and deaths and injuries arising from 
family feuds are grossly under-reported. Future empirical research on violence in 
Karachi can consider non-police sources, like information collected by 
ambulances affiliated with the Edhi Foundation. Unfortunately these types of 
sources are only found in the city and are not available online. 
 The dataset and associated graphs and charts are not merely quantitative 
in nature; the process of creating the dataset transformed into a qualitative 
exploration of the texture of violence in Karachi. Where do people get killed most 
often? Why are armed motorcycle riders murdering so many people? How does 
the semiotics of foreign weapons exacerbate violence in the city? How has the 
language of reporting on violence changed over the last 30 years? How do 
people change their quotidian activities during riots? These types of observations 
gained from making the database allowed for a clearer picture to emerge about 
the relationship between the history of violence in the city, its urban form, and 
how residents navigate and interact with their city. 
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3.3 Orangi and Lyari 
 Once the Karachi dataset was completed, entries coded with Orangi and 
Lyari were copied and set up in different databases. The lack of specificity in 
locations affects the validity of these town datasets. Often, articles mention that 
Orangi and Lyari were affected in city-wide riots but the death toll is an estimate 
for the whole city. In order to best present a holistic profile of violence for each 
town, these events coded as “city” under locations with their aggregate death toll 
are included in the town databases whenever Orangi and Lyari were affected. 
While the numbers in these datasets are not useful, the trends in violence and a 
comparison of the different types of violence in these towns are interesting. 
 The socio-spatial capital resilience model in this thesis rests upon the 
understanding of formal and informal social networks in Orangi, Lyari, and 
Karachi. This analysis would have been helped by data on the socioeconomic 
profiles of the city and the two towns but this information is unavailable. 
Pakistan’s last census was in 1998, and subsequent censuses have been 
postponed because of outbreaks of violence. Even if there were a more recent 
census, the data would have been collected at the city level and not at the town 
level. The city of Karachi website also does not contain this information so once 
again, newspapers were the main source of information. For this part of the 
project, more analysis-driven newspapers like Newsline were useful in 
investigating the sociological underpinnings of each town. Dawn news features 
on Youtube (in both English and Urdu) about crime in Karachi and Lyari were 
incredibly beneficial in visualizing the datasets and in understanding the 
relationships between violence and the built environment. 
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3.4 Orangi Pilot Project 
 The OPP’s website lists information on the financing and construction of 
sewer lines from the last fiscal quarter. While attempts were made to obtain 
copies of all the quarterly reports from 1980 in order to track the rate of sewer 
line building across time, they were unsuccessful. Instead, working with Dr. 
Khan’s books and Arif Hasan’s substantial articles on the history and evolution 
of the OPP was very helpful in understanding the OPP model and its efforts in 
building horizontal social capital between residents and vertical social capital 
between the town and state authorities. World Bank (2010) and Asian 
Development Bank (2005) reports on water and sanitation problems in Karachi, 
as well as maps and surveys of water and sewer lines prepared by the OPP-RTI, 
have been crucial in contextualizing the urban servicing problem in the city. 
Once again, a more qualitative approach based on a variety of international and 
national sources has allowed for a more multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral 
understanding of violence, a phenomenon with multiple deep roots. 
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Chapter 4. Karachi 
In every dust particle of the city rage a hundred cataclysms. 
-Adapted from the poetry of Mirza Ghalib 
Home to 15 million residents, Karachi is the economic hub of Pakistan. 
The city contributes 20% of national GDP, handles 95% of international trade, 
and is responsible for 40% of provincial revenues (ADB 2005). Often called “mini 
Pakistan” because of its diverse demographic profile, the city has been the dream 
destination for immigrants from all over Pakistan and India (Budhani et al. 2010). 
Unfortunately, the unchecked and unplanned growth of the city, combined with 
political infighting and the mafia-zation of all urban commodities, has created a 
city always teetering on the brink of civil war.  
This chapter attempts to unravel some of the threads in the tapestry of 
violence in Karachi. It will provide a brief overview of the types and trends of 
violence in the city using the data aggregated from multiple news sources, and 
will offer some insights into the spatial dynamics of conflict.  
4.1 History of Violence in Karachi: 1980-2010 
 Before delving into the 1980s, it is useful to step back and contextualize 
the waves of violence that have been attacking the city. Even before Partition in 
1947, Karachi endured sporadic ethnic, sectarian, and political conflicts because 
of its attractiveness as a cosmopolitan, industrial city in the Indian sub-continent 
(Budhani et al. 2010). After Partition, however, conflict in the city increased as 
Pakistani politicians conducted their own version of the Great Game in the 
country. Political violence escalated through the 1950s and 1960s and pitted the 
! 37!
Muhajirs against the Pathans over their divided political allegiances (Yusuf 2011). 
The early 1970s were characterized by the “language riots,” which arose from the 
Sindh provincial assembly’s decision to mandate educational institutions to teach 
the Sindhi language (Budhani et al. 2010). The Urdu-speaking Muhajirs, who 
were fighting for cultural, economic, and spatial rights to the city, retaliated 
through mob violence (Budhani et al. 2010). This wave of ethnic violence was 
quelled through political negotiations and law enforcement (Budhani et al. 2010). 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, military dictator, General Zia ul-Haq, 
came into power, and banned all political activity. Zia’s regime polarized politics 
in Karachi – university campus groups formed anti-Zia groups and Zia’s 
supporters, the Islamists, transformed into militant groups through their 
involvement with the Afghan jihad9 movement that started in 1978. Further, 
Pakistan’s support of the mujahideen in Afghanistan led to the creation of an 
unregulated arms market in Karachi, and the city eventually developed into a 
major transport node for Afghan weapons and drugs controlled by gangs in 
Karachi, mostly centered in Lyari (Yusuf 2011b; Budhani et al. 2010). 
 The start of the violence dataset in 1980 picks up the entry of Kalashnikovs 
and other weapons smuggled into Karachi. Figure 7 presents a rough idea of the 
peaks and troughs of violence in Karachi over the 30-year period. While very 
little data is available from 1980-1985, the descriptions of violence during this 
time reflects the changing nature of violence in the city with the appearance of 
Soviet and Afghan weapons. For example, in the early 1980s, homemade bombs 
were the weapons of choice for warring political and ethnic factions. Towards !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 A jihad, or struggle, is usually waged by Islamist fighters (mujahideen) for control of land. 
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the mid-1980s, however, reports start describing teenaged boys roaming the 
streets, guarding their ethnic enclaves and playing with Kalashnikovs like they 
were toys. Gayer (2007) reports that between 1986 and 1989, gun prices 
decreased by 40% to 50%, and argues that in the 1980s, the availability of 
weapons provided a sense of empowerment and wonder to the disenchanted 
young men of Sindh. The transnational Afghan jihad movement created heavily 
armed militant groups out of political and ethnic factions, and laid the 
foundation for a perennially armed civil society. 
 
Fig. 7: The human cost of violence in Karachi (the total number of deaths and injuries) 
from 1980 to 2010  
 
While violent campus politics was tearing the city apart, the ethnic profile 
of Karachi was changing. In the 1980s, the Pathans started moving to the city 
from the Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP) and Afghanistan. Since city 
planning was non-existent, katchi abadis (informal settlements) had sprung up all 
over the city, many of which were organized by political and ethnic affiliations. 
When the Pathans moved to Karachi, they took over the governance of some of 
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the settlements in the peripheries of the city, and branched out into the 
transportation sector (Yusuf 2011b; Budhani et al. 2010). The division of labour in 
the city thus became inextricable from ethnicity and place of origin with the 
Pathans controlling transportation and the Muhajirs dominating business and 
shipping. 
Jaffri and Verkaaik (2011) point out how the influx of Pathans changed 
Karachi and threatened the Muhajirs. Most of the immigrants from Afghanistan 
and the NWFP tended to be working-class and anti-Shia, which fuelled sectarian 
tensions already present in the city. The authors refer to the increasing number of 
Pathans in the city as the gradual “Talibanization” of Karachi. The Pathans 
settled in the peripheries of the city, mainly in Sohrab Goth near Federal B and 
Qasba Colony. Their involvement in transportation proved to be a very visible 
threat to the Muhajir community because of the layout of highways going in and 
out of Karachi. Jaffri and Verkaaik point out that there are only 3 expressways 
linking Karachi to the rest of Pakistan – the National Highway, the Super 
Highway, and the M-10, which passes Orangi (Figure 3). The Muhajirs’ 
perception that the Pathans controlled transportation, and thus transportation 
networks, intensified and spatialized the fight between ethnic groups for space in 
the city. 
The 1985 Bushra Zaidi riots in Orangi were the first of many ethnic wars 
that would shut down large parts of the city. Although this event appears as a 
mere dot on Figure 7, it is responsible for the much of the violence on the graph 
from 1986 to 1988. A Pathan minibus driver accidentally ran over a Muhajir 
college student in Liaquatabad, leading to one and a half years of ethnic riots in 
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Orangi, Nazimabad, and Liaquatabad between the Pathans, Muhajirs, and the 
Biharis (Gayer 2007; Siddiqui 2011). In response to escalating ethnic tensions, the 
Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) was founded as a militant student group 
fighting for the rights of Muhajirs with the assistance of weapons supplied by the 
Afghan jihadis. The city fractured further into groups of ethnic enclaves fiercely 
guarded by private armies. Many parts of the city became inaccessible to police 
and security forces, and political parties (Sindhi PPP and MQM) engaged in 
vicious games of kidnapping and torturing their opponents (Yusuf 2011b; 
Budhani et al. 2010).   
Finally, in 1992, the Army and the Rangers were called in for Operation 
Clean-up by the Pakistani government, targeting MQM leaders and MQM-
controlled areas. Figure 8 shows how the city was divided into Muhajir, Pathan, 
and mixed settlements. Most of the violence originated in the northern parts of 
the city, which forced many families to escape to the south of Karachi, which had 
remained relatively peaceful (Yusuf 2011b; Budhani et al. 2010).  
 
Fig. 8: Gayer (2004) illustrates a heavily divided city from 1981 to 2004. Karachi is 
divided into ethnic and political enclaves, as well as “no-go” zones in Korangi.  
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The period of 1993-1996 witnessed excessive ethnic, political, and 
sectarian violence, as exhibited by Figure 7. MQM leaders were actively hunted, 
killed, and exiled by the government. News from this period from the dataset 
details the murder of many Shia professionals on the streets of the city, and both 
Sunni mosques and Shia imambargahs were popular targets of bombs. This wave 
of sectarian violence was different from the one in the 1980s, which was usually 
marked by opposing religious processions attacking one another. At the end of 
this period, MQM leaders briefly retired from the political scene to regroup and 
plan their comeback, although political violence in the late 1990s continued to 
occur (Budhani et al. 2010). 
The September 11 attacks in 2001 proved to be the next turning point in 
Karachi’s history. With the Talibanization of Karachi and the general increase in 
anti-Western sentiment across the Muslim world, the targets of conflict became 
more international, which is reflected in the dataset. In May 2002, a suicide 
bomber killed 11 French nationals at the Sheraton in Saddar, who were helping 
the Pakistani Navy build a submarine (Dawn archives). Attacks on embassies and 
the Pakistani-American Cultural Center became more frequent, and symbols of 
the West, like Christian charities and fast food chains, became entrenched in the 
web of violence in Karachi.  
While political parties, ethnic factions, sectarian groups, and the Islamist 
groups were tearing the city apart, the burgeoning population was suffering 
from conflicts related to urban resource scarcity. Unlike other developing cities, 
like Mumbai, which face similar challenges in providing collective goods and 
services to a rapidly growing population, Karachi is home to a highly 
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weaponized citizenry. Therefore, any conflict, whether political or social, has a 
tendency to escalate into a violent confrontation. In the Karachi dataset, for 
example, there are multiple examples of personal disputes between families, 
friends, and neighbours, which end in deaths or injuries caused by guns. Urban 
developmental problems have become common triggers for violent attacks. 
The lack of state involvement in city planning and the division of the city’s 
resources by ethnic and political groups have created urban resource mafias. 
Often, these mafias are tied to political parties, and the presence of these ethnic-
political-resource mafias has further fragmented an already divided city. The 
water mafia steals water from illegal hydrants and sells it to katchi abadi residents 
not connected to the water supply at inflated prices, often leading to water riots 
(Dawn archives). The land mafia, which has perhaps become one of the most 
destructive forces in the city, forcibly takes over plots in the city and demands 
protection money from people with no formal property rights (Dawn archives). 
In fact, a large proportion of the recent economic violence in the Karachi dataset 
is attributed to clashes between the land mafia, the police, and people in informal 
settlements.  
Violence in Karachi towards the end of the 2000s is a complex mix of 
political clashes, institutional violence, and socioeconomic conflict. Political 
parties are still engaging in violent strikes, riots, and target killings to establish 
Karachi as their stronghold. The police department, which has effectively become 
another arm of political parties, often engages in custodial and extra-judicial 
killings, often leading to multiple instances of vigilante justice on the part of the 
people. While sectarian and ethnic tensions have died down, socioeconomic 
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conflict as a result of a weak labour market, inadequate housing, and the daily 
struggle for basic amenities like water, education, and sanitation services, has 
increased. As the next section will point out, Karachi at the end of 2010 is more a 
victim of the state’s incompetence and neglect than a city divided by ethnic and 
sectarian loyalties. 
4.2 Trends in Conflict 
 The dataset presents some interesting trends in violence in the city from 
1980 to 2010: 
• In the 1980s, many of the violent incidents were large-scale bombs in 
public places with massive death tolls. With the escalation of political 
violence in the 1990s and the growing popularity of political target 
killings, violent events increased in number but decreased in number of 
victims. For example, in August 1983, a bomb thrown at a police station in 
Liaquatabad killed 31 people, while in July 2008, 400 people were target 
killed in the city through individual shootings (Dawn archives). 
Interestingly, these target killings cause more widespread panic and shut 
down larger parts of the city than bombs in public places because of the 
seeming randomness. 
• Using ambulance data, Mian et al. (2002) argue that political affiliation is 
the most common reason for homicide in Karachi. They find that people 
who died in their sample were 34 times more likely to have attended 
political processions and 19 times more likely to have been to political 
meetings. Figure 9, which shows the distribution of the different types of 
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violence, emphasizes a similar trend. Besides social violence (which also 
encompasses all target killings not accounted for and thus may be 
deceptively larger), political violence is the second biggest source of 
conflict in Karachi. While the mid-1990s may have shut down the city 
because of intense political clashes, political violence in Karachi has not 
abated and continues at a smaller but more persistent scale. 
 
Fig. 9: The largest sources of violence in Karachi from 1980 to 2010 are social, political, 
and economic. 
 
• Figure 9 also points out that the largest sources of violence in the city are 
social, political, economic, and institutional, which implies that political 
confrontations, ineffective state agencies, police corruption, and an acute 
lack of jobs is driving the violence in Karachi, and not ethnic and sectarian 
fault lines. This is useful for people in the city dealing with violence 
reduction and prevention because developmental problems have 
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pragmatic solutions, unlike Huntingtonian “clash[es] of civilizations” 
(Huntington 1993). 
4.3 Spatial Dynamics of Conflict 
The dataset also yields some insights into where the conflict hotspots are 
in Karachi. Figure 3 is reproduced again below: 
 
Fig. 3: Only 3 highways connect Karachi to the rest of Pakistan. The general perception 
in the city is that the Pathans, who are heavily represented in the transport sector, 
control the routes in and out of Karachi. Source: Google Maps. 
 
• Saddar, the heart of Karachi and the old city, is frequently a victim of 
violence in the city, especially after 9/11. Many embassies, including the 
U.S. Consulate, are located in Saddar, along with the Sindh High Court 
and foreign 5-star hotels like the Sheraton. 
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• Drive-by shootings by motorcycle riders with helmets and guns are the 
most common causes of murders, especially in target killings. Sectarian 
murders usually take place outside mosques and imambargahs, while the 
victim is exiting after prayers. If Shia professionals are being targeted, 
they usually get killed on their way to or from work on the street. In fact, 
many people in the city feel that their commute is more dangerous than 
the place they live in. For example, an Orangi resident commented in 2008 
that while he feels safe in his area, his commute through the Pathan-
dominated Qasba Colony puts him on edge (Newsline archives). 
• Main roads, like the M.A. Jinnah Rd., and intersections, like the Guru 
Mandir one, attract a lot of violence possibly because of the popularity of 
motorbike murders. 
• From the dataset, residents from some parts of the city appear to be 
responsible for violence in the city, while others are victims. For example, 
in many of the news articles, people often comment that the mobs came 
from roads leading out of Lyari or Sohrab Goth. Perhaps some of these 
comments are more governed by negative perceptions of certain areas and 
katchi abadis than accuracy. A further exploration of spatial interactions 
between different parts of the city is useful in understanding how violence 
migrates across urban space.  
• University campuses appear to be sites of contention again in 2010 after 
wave of campus violence in the 1980s. There have been clashes between 
political and ethnic groups at Karachi University, the Aga Khan 
University, and the Federal Urdu University of Arts, Science, and 
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Technology (FUUAST). One hopes that this is not the start of yet another 
cycle of destructive political violence for Karachi. 
This chapter laid out the history of violence in Karachi between 1980 and 2010 
and pointed out that social, political, economic, and institutional factors were the 
biggest sources of violence in the city during this period. The next chapter will 
look at violence in Orangi and Lyari, two towns in Karachi, and examine the 
relationship between violence and socio-spatial capital through the analysis of 
urban form and mediating institutions of civic structures, like the Orangi Pilot 
Project.  
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Chapter 5. The Orangi Pilot Project: Socio-spatial Capital and Urban Violence 
Clearly there are two apparently irreconcilable approaches to project execution [in 
Orangi]. One, open-ended, exploratory, and evolutionary with emphasis on sociological 
particularities, unconstrained by time and cost. The other, target-oriented, systematic, 
with a professional and technical focus, constrained by time and costs. 
-Nicholas Houghton, Chief Technical Advisor, UNCHS, Karachi, 1982 
 Karachi’s economic potential is greatly checked by chronic violence, 
unfettered population growth, and uncontrolled urban sprawl. Katchi abadis 
crowd the city, and many residents live in settlements with no formal access to 
water, health, education, and sanitation services, subject to the violent whims of 
the mafias, gangs, and political parties who control these resources. What 
happens to the level of violence in unplanned areas when they receive urban 
services? Is violence in a town connected to its urban form? Do social networks 
in a town affect violence? These are some of the questions this chapter will 
explore, using the examples of Orangi and Lyari. 
 The first section provides a brief socioeconomic profile of Orangi, 
including the types of violence the area has experienced. The second part will 
look at the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), which has helped residents build low-cost 
sanitation facilities. The next section will investigate the OPP’s role in reducing 
violence in the area. The fourth part uses Lyari as a comparison to Orangi and 
will describe its socioeconomic and violence profile. Section 5.5 asks why the 
OPP exists in Orangi and not Lyari through a discussion of civic structures and 
social capital in the area. The last part moves into the theoretical realm and 
applies concepts from the resilience literature review from Chapter 2 to Orangi 
and Lyari. 
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5.1 Orangi 
 Located in the northwest part of the city near the M-10, Orangi has been 
the destination of many immigrant populations since it formed in the peripheries 
of 1960s Karachi (Figure 10). While it is often referred to as a slum, especially 
when compared to Dharavi in Mumbai, it is actually a low-income settlement 
that is considered to be 85% katchi abadi. 1.2 million people live in Orangi, and it 
is often referred to as a “mini-Karachi” because of its heterogeneous 
composition. The dominant ethnic groups, who often live in colonies segregated 
by ethnicity, are the Muhajirs, Pashtuns, Balochis, Punjabis, Sindhis, and the 
Bohras. The town has a mixture of income classes, including lower middle class, 
and many residents work as transporters (Dawn archives; Hasan 2007). 
 
Fig. 10: Rough layout of settlements in Orangi Town. Most of the houses are organized 
around straight lanes. The M-10 highway leading into Balochistan (not pictured here) 
lies to the west of Orangi. The town’s proximity to the M-10 is an attraction to many of 
the residents, who work as transporters. Source: Google Maps. 
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Figures 11 and 12 provide a look at the texture of the urban fabric in 
Orangi. Most of the houses are organized on either side of straight lanes, and 
consist of single- or double-storey buildings. Around 100,000 of these units are 
informally built (Hasan 2007). Because it is located away from the old city, its 
urban density is low compared to heavily built-up areas in the center of the city, 
like Saddar and Lyari. Since it is classified as a katchi abadi, the Karachi 
Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) does not extend urban services to the area. 
Consequently, before the emergence of the OPP in 1980, the area suffered from 
what Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan called “medieval sanitation” (Dawn archives). 
 
Fig. 11: Layout of houses in Orangi, spread out over a natural slope on the peripheries of 
the old city of Karachi. Source: Tribune. 
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Fig. 12: A lane in Orangi Town. Houses in the area are organized around lanes, making 
the lane an important unit of analysis in understanding violence and infrastructure 
development in the settlement. Source: Revista Amauta. 
 
 Because of diverse ethnicities, and consequently divided political loyalties 
in Orangi, the area has often been the epicenter of ethnic and political violence. 
For example, the Bushra Zaidi riots in 1985 and ensuing ethnic wars wrecked the 
district in the mid-1980s, forcing residents to flee to other parts of the city (Dawn 
archives).  Figures 13 and 14 show the human costs of damage in Orangi and the 
distribution of the types of violence from 1980 to 2010. Figure 13, which looks 
very similar to Karachi’s Figure 7 with its peaks in 1985, 1995, and 2010, is 
reflective of Orangi’s status as a microcosm of Karachi.  Figure 14, which shows 
the distribution of violence in Orangi, is also similar to the proportions of 
Karachi’s Figure 7. However, compared to the city of Karachi, Orangi 
experiences less economic violence and more institutional violence, as expected 
from its struggles with the police and urban servicing agencies in its quest for 
access to formal amenities.  
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Fig. 13: Human cost of violence in Orangi from 1980 to 2010. The peaks and troughs 
appear similar to the Karachi graph, which reinforces Orangi’s ethnic diversity. 
 
 
Fig. 14: Distribution of violence in Orangi from 1980 to 2010. Social and political factors 
are most responsible for violence in the area. 
 
 Another feature of the nature of violence in Orangi is its vulnerability to 
exogenous shocks. Some reports suggest that Orangi might be a source of 
violence, citing its possible status as a weapons warehouse for militant groups 
because of its proximity to the M-10, which leads all the way up to the Afghan 
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border through the N-25 (Newsline archives). However, with the decline of 
purely ethnic violence in the city and the advent of the OPP, many news articles 
suggest that it has become a fairly safe area. However, political clashes which 
erupt in other parts of the city do spread to Orangi because of its heterogeneous 
composition (although many residents support the MQM) (Dawn archives; 
Hasan 2007).  
 The next section details how the OPP brought low-cost sanitation to 
Orangi, one of the largest and most violent katchi abadis in the city, and in the 
process, transformed its socioeconomic and built environment. 
5.2 Overview of the OPP 
 The OPP was started by Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan in 1980 when the Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)10 was exploring development 
projects in Orangi. Dr. Khan, a Pakistani social scientist, started his field research 
in the area by driving around Orangi in a battered jeep and talking to the 
residents about their everyday concerns. From his interviews with the residents 
emerged a general plan to provide low-cost sanitation that focused entirely on 
community ownership of space devoid of foreign intervention (Hasan 2007; 
Khan 1996; Barmazel 2005).  
Dr. Khan recognized that many of the residents were already in the 
process of building sewer lines but were either not placing the pipes correctly or 
were building them in opposite directions in the same lane as a result of tensions 
between neighbours. He came up with four general goals for the OPP, which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 The BCCI Foundation is now known as INFAQ.
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replaced the targets and timelines present in most development projects. He 
wanted residents to claim ownership of their space instead of expecting the 
government to provide services11 and organize themselves by lanes, working 
through community tensions. The OPP also intended to provide technical 
assistance to residents and pursue low-cost infrastructure for increased 
community participation (Hasan 2007).  
The OPP process is simple. Each lane (around 20-40 houses) has to 
organize and elect a lane manager in charge of collecting funds. The lanes then 
apply to the OPP for technical and financial assistance, and OPP representatives 
organize and supervise the work of the residents (Hasan 2007). Forcing lanes to 
organize without OPP help and apply to the low-cost sanitation program 
increased the residents’ sustained commitment to constructing sewer lines 
(Barmazel 2005). Hasan (2007) reports that the ratio of the people’s investment in 
low-cost sanitation in Orangi to the investment of the OPP-RTI is 1:18.2. 
While the OPP champions self-help activities of katchi abadi residents, it 
does not want to alienate or replace the state. The organization works on an 
internal/external concept, where Orangi residents are responsible only for the 
construction of latrines in their homes and secondary sewer lines in their lanes 
leading to natural drains. The OPP would ideally like the government (in the 
form of SKAA, KMC, and KWSB) to step in and assume responsibility for the 
external primary lines and waste treatment plants. While the Sindh Katchi Abadi 
Authorities (SKAA) has been receptive to OPP’s involvement in Orangi and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Hasan (2007) notes that it takes 15-20 years for katchi abadi residents to get access to formal state 
services. 
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other informal settlements in Karachi, the KMC and the Karachi Water and 
Sewerage Board (KWSB) have ignored the OPP’s contributions (Hasan 2007).  
In 1982, the OPP received a proposal from the United Nations Center for 
Human Settlements (UNCHS), which became an inadvertent test for its 
effectiveness. The UNCHS offered to provide technical assistance to the OPP in 
the form of a seven-year partnership funded by the BCCI. However, the OPP’s 
bottom-up working style and the UNCHS’s more formal approach to 
development did not work well together, and Orangi was subsequently divided 
in two – in one area, the OPP continued their work, and in the other, the 
Community Development Project (CDP) from UNCHS started building their 
own sewer lines. At the end of the seven-year period, there was a clear winner – 
the CDP spent $625,000 to build 36 sewer lines while the OPP had constructed 
more than 4,000 sewer lines at one-third of the cost. The CDP area was then 
returned to the OPP (Barmazel 2005). As of August 2011, the OPP has built 90% 
of sewer lines in Orangi, as shown in Figure 15 (OPP-RTI). 
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Fig. 15: Sewer lines built in Orangi by the OPP from 1980 to 2006. Each red line 
represents a resident-built sewer line. Source: OPP-RTI. 
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 Despite interference from UNCHS, the OPP continued to flourish. Its rate 
of construction of sewer lines caught its momentum around the mid-1980s, 
around the time ethnic riots broke out in Orangi (Hasan 1995; Khan 1996). In 
1998, the OPP expanded into three separate entities – the OPP-RTI, the Orangi 
Charitable Trust (OCT), and the Karachi Health and Social Development Agency 
(KHASDA) in order to better address the evolving credit, health, and community 
development needs of Orangi residents once sanitation problems were taken care 
of (Hasan 2007). Figure 16 shows the general growth of the OPP’s assets from 
1989 to 2005. 
 
Fig. 16: Adapted from Hasan (2007), this graph shows how assets, expenditure, and 
income of the OPP have changed over time.  
 
Besides increasing its services in Orangi, the OPP had also started 
mapping and surveying other katchi abadis in Karachi to prepare maps of water 
and sewer line connections for each area. In 1994, the Youth Training Programme 
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was set up in Orangi to provide mapping, surveying, and community 
mobilization skills to help the OPP in its survey of the informal settlements in 
Karachi. So far about 60% (364) of all katchi abadis in Karachi have been surveyed 
(Hasan 2007). 
Both Hasan (2007) and Zaidi (2001) describe the incredible impact of low-
cost sanitation on Orangi’s built environment and social space. For the first time, 
lanes were clear of sewage and rubbish and children could play in the streets. 
Women could move more easily outside, and Zaidi (2001) notes that perhaps 
marriage prospects for women increased with expanded mobility. Property 
values increased by 30%, which prompted many residents to formalize their 
property rights, the infant mortality rate dramatically dropped, and better health 
for all residents translated into more stable livelihoods. The residents recognized 
their success in building their own sewer lines, and expanded upon their self-
help capabilities by building private schools and clinics in the area, which 
outnumber state facilities. The only losers in Orangi were the doctors, who saw 
their steady stream of patients dwindling as a result of the OPP (Hasan 2007). 
The success of the low-cost sanitation project has made the OPP strategy 
popular in the rest of Pakistan. Although it has been replicated 284 times in 11 
towns in Pakistan, Orangi remains the most successful case. In other areas, 
replication attempts have failed for various reasons, from the lack of cohesion in 
a lane to different political parties hijacking OPP proposals for political gain at 
various stages of the construction process (Hasan 2007).  
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In Orangi, the OPP is still struggling to formulate the best strategy for 
working with government. The internal/external concept is ideal in leveraging 
both the resources of the community and the state but has not found much 
success because of the ineffectiveness of mediating state agencies like the KWSB 
and the KMC. The KWSB is in debt to the Asian Development Bank for $7 billion 
and has yet to start servicing its loan, which is currently being processed at the 
provincial government level. While the OPP has taught its residents to closely 
work with and monitor the efforts of KMC engineers, the residents complain of 
shoddy workmanship on the part of KMC (Hasan 1997; Hasan 2007). From its 
recent Quarterly Reports, it is evident that the OPP has moved from attempting 
to work with government to empowering residents to lobby the state for services. 
At the national level, however, OPP-RTI has found success in helping the 
country plan its sanitation policies. In addition to preparing maps for the 
different union councils and informal settlements in Karachi, it was also invited 
by the government to help plan the 2006 National Sanitation Policy, which the 
OPP-RTI formulated at one-third the cost of other private sector plans (Hasan 
2007).  
In a diverse town torn by different types of ethnic, social, and institutional 
violence, the OPP has played the role of a civic structure bridging ethnic and 
political groups, and increasing interethnic engagement. Through its relatively 
hands-off lane organization policy, it has encouraged residents to independently 
overcome underlying tensions and unite for a larger cause, building horizontal 
social capital. Its internal/external concept is evidence that the OPP does not 
neglect vertical social capital, linking Orangi to the state or to other parts of 
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Karachi. In fact, its involvement in mapping other informal settlements and 
employing the youth of Orangi in this project is one example of how the OPP has 
forged links between the area and the larger city of Karachi. 
The next section asks the following question: with all the horizontal and 
vertical social capital the OPP has constructed in Orangi, has there been any 
impact on the level of violence in the area? 
5.3 OPP Effect on Violence in Orangi? 
 It is impossible to escape violence in Karachi. Brass (2005)’s political “riot 
machines” cause widespread damage while robbers and armed gangs engage in 
random shooting sprees. Can a civic structure like the OPP make a difference in 
this chaotic landscape? 
 Barmazel (2005) points out that it is difficult to measure the effects of the 
OPP on violence because one needs to count the number of violent events that 
did not occur as a result of the organization – an impossibility. However, both 
Barmazel (2005) and Khan (1996) describe two events in Orangi, which 
emphasize that while the OPP cannot prevent violence from affecting the area, it 
can mitigate the effects of these exogenous shocks and prevent further conflicts. 
This prevention of further conflicts is particularly important in Karachi because 
violence in the city is like a game of Dominoes – one instance of conflict can 
easily spiral into a city-wide riot in a matter of hours. 
 Dr. Khan reminisces about the Bushra Zaidi riots in 1985 in Orangi, which 
devastated the area. He writes about his fear that ethnic and political loyalties 
would crush the fragile connections the OPP had constructed in five years. While 
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the OPP could not prevent ethnic wars from taking place, it could use its 
community connections and technical assistance to help the people focus on 
reconstruction and not revenge. The OPP started re-building houses razed by the 
fires and helped people get compensation for their material losses. The OPP staff, 
along with lane managers and health workers, helped calm the anti-Pathan 
frenzy in a largely Muhajir area, and reminded residents that Orangi was an 
urban industrial community dependent on symbiotic relationships between 
different groups. Many people who had been involved with OPP’s efforts 
brought the Pathans, who had fled Orangi because of the riots, back into their 
homes and schools (Khan 1996). 
 A similar incident occurred again in 1990 when a group of armed Muhajirs 
from outside Orangi came into the area and set fire to 68 houses in Baloch 
Colony because of some event that had transpired miles away in Hyderabad. 
Although the conflagration did not spark ethnic wars, many Balochis fled Orangi 
because they feared for their lives, and attempted to get Balochis outside of 
Orangi to take revenge on Muhajirs in Orangi. The OPP, however, stepped in and 
asked the Bihari neighbours of the Balochis to escort them back into the 
neighbourhood and protect them from any further attacks. Simultaneously, they 
engaged in reconstruction efforts in order to divert the attention away from 
revenge to rebuilding, preventing any further escalation of ethnic tensions. 
 These two examples show that the social networks cultivated by the OPP 
and the trust the residents have in the organization have had an effect in 
minimizing the effects of exogenous shocks. The next section will look at socio-
spatial capital in Lyari, another violent town in Karachi. 
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5.4 Comparison: Lyari and the Rest of the City 
 Lyari is often called the soul of Karachi (Dawn archives). It is located in the 
center of the old city, near the port and Saddar, and in the 1960s and 1970s, it 
enjoyed a vibrant music and arts scene (Yusuf 2008b). Unfortunately, 
contemporary Lyari is branded as the haven of warring gangs affiliated with the 
PPP and has become an informal “no-go” area (Dawn archives).  
 Figures 17 through 20 show Lyari’s location in the heart of the city and 
downtown Karachi, and highlight its crumbling built environment. The town, 
which is the smallest area-wise in Karachi, is squished in between the Lyari River 
and busy highways that service the port. Lyari is cramped and densely built-up, 
with dark, narrow, curving roads, perfect for gang shootouts and the hiding of 
weapons and drug caches (Dawn archives). Decades of violence caused by gang 
wars have prevented development agencies and security forces from stepping 
into Lyari, and the results are haphazard construction of multiple floors on 
existing buildings and weak links to urban services. Figure 20 shows Lyari’s 
sewer and drain map prepared by the OPP. The network of sewer line coverage 
in Lyari compared to Orangi (Figure 15) is evidence of poor water and sanitation 
facilities in the town. 
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Fig. 17: Location of Lyari in the heart of old Karachi. In terms of area, Lyari is the 
smallest town in Karachi. Compared to Orangi, Lyari’s buildings are more densely 
packed. Source: Google Maps. 
 
 
Fig. 18: Poor living conditions in Lyari. Compared to Orangi, which is mostly composed 
of one- to two-storey houses, Lyari has multi-storey apartment buildings, with floors 
being continually added on. Source: Time Magazine. 
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Fig. 19: Urban fabric of Lyari - narrow streets and alleys framed by decaying, dilapidated 
buildings. Source: Google Images. 
 
 
Fig. 20: Existing sewer and drainage system in Lyari. Compared to the Orangi sewer 
map (Fig. 13 ), the town’s sewer line coverage is not extensive. Many of the areas without 
sewer lines are densely built-up with narrow, curving roads, which makes it more 
difficult and expensive to build sewer lines. Source: OPP-RTI. 
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One million people live in Lyari, and most of them are Balochis (Dawn 
archives). Unlike Orangi, which is a more modern, heterogeneous immigrant 
community, people in Lyari have known one another for years. The town is 
composed of mostly low-income classes and unemployment is rampant. Many 
people find work in physical labour industries like fishing and shipbuilding 
(Naqvi 2010). Dawn interviews with Lyari residents and political representatives 
dispel some of the perceptions of Lyari as a town filled with PPP gang members 
intent on destroying Karachi. According to the residents, unemployment and 
urban redevelopment are their most prominent concerns, not the gangs. They 
point to abandoned schools and hospitals in Lyari and deplore the state’s 
sporadic attempts to “re-build” Lyari by constructing more empty buildings 
during elections to secure votes (Dawn archives). Conscious state neglect of 
Lyari, which ensures a constant supply of disenchanted and unemployed young 
men who eventually become thugs, is beneficial for political parties. Naqvi (2010) 
eloquently rephrases Brass (2005)’s “political riot machines,” when she writes 
that “Lyari is the servants' quarter for the tribal mentality holders of power, the 
rulers of Pakistan.” 
Violence in Lyari is primarily economic. Dawn articles, Naqvi (2010), and 
the Lyari dataset highlight that many sources of economic violence in Karachi 
originate in Lyari. For example, besides the infamous Arshad Pappu and the 
Rehman Dakait gangs, the town is also home to numerous members of the land 
and water mafia.  
Figures 21 and 22 show the levels and distribution of violence in Lyari 
from 1980 to 2010. The graph and chart are very different from Orangi’s and 
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Karachi’s visual representations of violence. For example, Lyari does not have 
the peaks in 1985 and 1995 caused by ethnic and political violence, probably 
because most of the MQM-related conflict was localized in the northern part of 
the city. The distribution of violence in Figure 22 emphasizes the economic 
nature of violence in the area, arising from gang wars and drug and weapons 
trafficking. Since Lyari is ethnically (and politically) more homogeneous, the 
fault lines tend to be economic and gang-related. 
 
Fig. 21: Human cost of violence in Lyari from 1980 to 2010. The differences between this 
graph and the ones for Karachi and Orangi are extensive. Lyari does not have the 
characteristic peaks in 1985 and 1996 that correspond to the massive ethnic and political 
violence during those years. 
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Fig. 22: Distribution of violence in Lyari. Economic and social violence dominate the 
town, which correspond to the qualitative evidence that gang-related violence is 
prevalent. 
 
 In order to ensure that the Lyari graphs are not a fluke, Figures 23 and 24 
highlight the levels and distribution of violence in other parts of Karachi, 
omitting Orangi and Lyari. These figures are consistent with the city’s and 
Orangi’s graphs, where social violence forms the biggest source of conflict, and 
the characteristic peaks appear in 1985 and 1995. Further research on the violence 
at the sub-city level in Karachi can examine the level and type of violence for 
each town in Karachi, similar to the OPP concept of giving each neighbourhood 
drainage and water maps. This vein of analysis can point out whether violence in 
an area is endogenous or exogenous, and can provide a deeper understanding of 
how each town interacts with another socially and spatially for strategic violence 
reduction policies. 
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Fig. 23: Human cost of violence in the rest of Karachi, omitting Orangi and Lyari. This 
is a test to see if the Lyari graphs are a fluke. The graph for the rest of Karachi looks very 
similar to the Karachi and Orangi graphs. 
 
 
Fig. 24: The distribution of violence in the rest of Karachi, leaving out Orangi and Lyari. 
The distribution of violence in the rest of the city is similar to the distribution for the 
whole of Karachi and Orangi. 
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5.5 Civic Structures and Social Capital in Lyari 
 Social capital in Lyari is organized around gang affiliation. Even if 
residents do not want to belong to a particular gang or political party, they are 
sometimes forced to join a group to seek protection in times of high violence 
(Dawn archives). The only civic structure rivaling the OPP in Lyari is the Lyari 
Peace Committee (LPC), started by Rehman Dakait (Dawn archives, Newsline 
archives). Opinions on the LPC are conflicted. On one hand, supporters of the 
LPC point to many urban interventions the committee has implemented in 
cleaning up the built environment of Lyari and to the donations of the Dakait 
family during Eid. On the other hand, MQM supporters call the LPC another 
extension of the PPP. Either case presents the same conclusion for social capital 
in Lyari – negative social capital organized around gang or political affiliations 
leaves no room at the top for a civic structure like the OPP. To re-visit Varshney’s 
(2002) model, while the OPP boosts interethnic engagement between different 
groups, the negative social capital in Lyari increases intra-group engagement 
with no bridging institution. This negative social capital associated with gangs 
also effectively prevents any vertical social capital between residents of Lyari, 
other parts of Karachi, and the state. 
 Despite the overwhelming presence of negative social capital associated 
with gangs in the town, there are pockets of positive social capital. These social 
networks mirror the urban form of Lyari – they are hidden, exist in corners, and 
are tightly grouped. Dawn and Newsline report the existence of street schools 
(Figure 25) and women’s cooperatives in Lyari, similar to efforts in Orangi. 
However, because of the general poverty of the town and the suffocating 
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negative social capital of the gangs, these positive social networks often consist of 
less than five people, hidden from the mainstream (Dawn archives, Newsline 
archives). 
 
Fig. 25: One of the street schools in Lyari. Positive social capital in Lyari exists in 
pockets and has not scaled up to the OPP level. Source: Flickr. 
 
 The differences in urban form between Orangi and Lyari also affect the 
types of existing social capital and the entrance of positive civic structures like 
the OPP. While Orangi is largely an informal settlement, it is still organized by 
lanes, and does not have the high urban density Lyari has. The lanes in Orangi 
play a large role in the effectiveness of the OPP - the straight lanes provide space 
for sewer lines to be easily constructed by the residents, and the lane naturally 
transforms into an organizational unit.  
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 Further, the topography of Orangi is more conducive to sewer line 
construction than that of Lyari. As Zaidi (2001) writes, Orangi lies on a natural 
slope, which makes it cheaper to build sewer lines because no pumping station is 
needed. Lyari, on the other hand, lies on relatively flat land near the port, and is 
densely built-up, which would make sewer lines expensive and difficult to build. 
These spatial differences also make it easier for the residents of Orangi to adopt 
the OPP’s internal/external concept compared to the people living in Lyari. 
 Dr. Khan (1996) writes that people in Orangi were already laying down 
some sewer lines before the OPP entered town. One can contrast the initiative of 
Orangi residents to the people of Lyari. Were they also trying to build sewer 
lines and water lines without state intervention? While no examples exist of 
community-built sewer lines in Lyari, one can examine the spatial differences 
between Orangi and Lyari to determine if the urban form is conducive to self-
help infrastructure projects. Perhaps one of the motivations for Orangi residents 
to build their own sewer lines is the availability of space and straight roads 
outside their houses. Where would Lyari residents build sewer lines? The roads 
are narrow and curvy, and often lead to dead-ends. Lyari is also sandwiched 
between the port and national highways, which may make building a sewer line 
to a natural drain difficult. 
 Constant violence in the area and the lack of a cohesive organizational 
unit would have also hampered community initiatives to build sewer lines. 
Compared to Orangi, Lyari is a source of crime in Karachi, not a victim. News 
articles report regular gun battles after sunset in the area, and many schools and 
hospitals in town have been abandoned simply because people are too afraid to 
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go to work (Dawn archives, Newsline archives). In such a perpetually violent 
environment, how can someone be comfortable building a sewer line outside for 
hours? Further, the haphazard construction of housing and shacks in Lyari, 
along with the general vertical expansion of houses in the area, make finding a 
single organizational unit difficult. Orangi has straight lanes but can Lyari 
residents organize around their curvy streets? 
5.6 Re-Visiting Resilience Theory: Orangi and Lyari 
 This section applies the ideas of resilience from Chapter 2 to Orangi and 
Lyari. In a chronically violent landscape, Orangi residents have managed to 
overcome ethnic and political differences to unite around infrastructure 
provision projects organized by the OPP. As a result, living standards in the area 
have improved, and while the OPP cannot prevent violence, it has definitely 
played a part in mitigating the effects of exogenous shocks on the community. It 
is a positive example of urban resilience because, to use Olson’s (2007) definition 
of resilience, the residents of Orangi have found innovative ways of coping and 
moving forward with their lives, while adapting to the perennially changing 
landscape of violence in Karachi. 
 If Orangi is resilient, what about Lyari? Perhaps residents in Lyari are 
more resilient than people in Orangi because they have bigger battles – 
endogenous violence, poor urban form, conscious state neglect, and overt 
political manipulation. They may not have a version of the OPP or regular access 
to water and sanitation services but residents continue to survive in the same 
area and make incremental improvements to their environment and social space 
! 73!
by building houses or by running women’s cooperatives and street schools. 
Holling’s (1973) definition of resilience can be invoked here to demonstrate how 
Lyari residents have the capacity to withstand shocks and still maintain their 
lives. 
 The examples of Orangi and Lyari as resilient spaces emphasize, once 
again, the problem of using stability concepts to examine chronic phenomenon. 
How does categorizing Orangi and Lyari as resilient spaces advance the study of 
chronic violence? In declaring both spaces resilient, positive projects like the OPP 
stand out less in a comparative analysis of Orangi and Lyari. If a town with the 
OPP and a town with gangs and the LPC are both considered resilient against 
violence, what is the purpose of the concept of urban resilience? If Lyari and 
Orangi are both resilient against chronic violence, does this mean no violence 
reduction or prevention strategies are necessary in these areas? These are 
problems in moving forward with using a concept like resilience. 
 Yusuf (2011a) refers to the problems of applying the term ‘resilience’ to 
Karachi. She describes the concept as a word-of-last-resort when one is out of 
options in describing a perennially violent city. Politicians like the concept 
because it allows them to sidestep any responsibility for causing violence and for 
the failure of police reform and urban development in the city. For citizens, 
celebrating their resilience is the only positive spin on the wide-range of coping 
mechanisms one has to formulate and endure in a violent city with a fragile state. 
Yusuf (2011b) writes that for Karachi residents, “resilience… is more akin to 
resignation to one’s fate… [and] is a euphemism for a pervasive lack of faith in 
the state.” Using the idea of resilience cannot push the analysis of violence into 
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finding pathways to peace, or at the very least, less violence. The next section 
will identify one possible alternative for the study of chronic violence based on 
the different approaches to violence discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 75!
Chapter 6. Reflections on Socio-Spatial Resilience in Cities with Chronic 
Conflict 
City soul is located in the architecture of the space between people and is predicated by 
congruent aspirations and social commonality. … An ugly city speaks of a soul 
derogative to itself. A lovely city speaks of people who have sought a higher version of 
themselves. 
-Pier Giorgio di Cicco, Poet Laureate of Toronto, 2008 
This thesis is interested in the application of the concept of resilience to 
cities suffering from chronic violence. Is the idea useful in advancing our 
knowledge of violent cities and in preventing or reducing violence in the 
afflicted area? The methods were two-fold: first, examples of resilience from 
different disciplines were examined to highlight some of the problems of 
extending resilience into the study of chronic violence. Second, using a socio-
spatial capital model, this thesis explored the connection between violence and 
infrastructure provision in two towns in Karachi to test out the idea of a resilient 
space.  
Using inferences from resilience theory and the Karachi case study, this 
chapter provides some reflections on the usefulness of alternative approaches to 
chronic violence. The first section summarizes the problems associated with 
resilience theory and proposes an alternative approach – Ring’s (2006) conflict 
resolution framework complemented by Lederach’s (1995) conflict 
transformation model. The second section will illustrate the importance in 
studying both social networks and the spatial features of an area in violence 
prevention and reduction strategies. 
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6.1 From Resilience to Conflict Transformation 
 The overview of resilience theory in Chapter 2 emphasized two ideas: 1) 
the idea of a resilient system is more useful in the case of an acute shock rather 
than a chronic one, and 2) the desire for stability and the return to system 
equilibrium characterizes the application of resilience to a system. These aspects 
of resilience are problematic in understanding chronic violence because it is an 
inevitable phenomenon, not a defined shock.  
 In the case of Karachi, the city is resilient both as an idea and as a city 
simply because it persists. As Vale and Campanella (2005) point out, modern 
cities are always re-built after shocks, not abandoned like some historical cities. 
The resilience test thus becomes useful at the sub-city level – how does each 
town or neighbourhood cope with violence? In both the Orangi and Lyari case 
studies, coping mechanisms (or strategies of resilience) exist at different scales, 
from the OPP to the Lyari street schools. The resilience test highlights the 
problem with using resilience – in dealing with chronic violence, people either 
cope or succumb to conflict. If resilience is a study of coping mechanisms, where 
is the attempt to move the system out of chronic violence and not merely reward, 
replicate, and reinforce coping mechanisms?  
 It is useful here to re-visit the different interpretations of conflict posited 
by Varshney (2002), Brass (2003), and Ring (2006). Out of the three authors, 
Varshney provides some semblance of hope in his civic structure hypothesis by 
arguing that institutions bridging ethnic groups can reduce violence, as 
evidenced by the OPP example. Brass (2003) adopts a more pessimistic attitude 
and refers to institutionalized political violence controlled by the state. The Brass 
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(2003) category of violence characterizes much of Karachi’s political violence 
when city-wide riots break out as a result of political parties declaring strikes and 
war on one another. Lyari is victim of this institutional violence where 
Varshney’s civic structures are unable to penetrate the tight violence-producing 
networks from the state to the Lyari gangs.  
 Ring’s (2006) conflict resolution approach incorporates Brass (2003) and 
Varshney (2002) and provides a way forward that moves beyond theories of the 
benefits of civil institutions and the horrors of the endless production of violence. 
Ring (2006) is especially crucial in the study of chronic violence because she 
argues that conflict is inevitable and is a prominent feature of social 
relationships. However, she describes conflict resolution and mediation 
techniques used in the everyday context of a multi-ethnic apartment building in 
Karachi; conflict characterizes most of the relationships but negotiations prevent 
the escalation of disputes into violence. This conflict resolution framework is 
evident in the OPP’s dealing with violence in Orangi. While the OPP remains 
neutral, it does try to mitigate the effects of exogenous violence in the town 
through one form of conflict mediation – reconstruction of infrastructure. In the 
1985 and 1990 ethnic riots, the OPP attempted to quell further retaliations in 
Orangi by focusing the residents’ attention on reconstruction, not revenge. This 
form of conflict management transformed what could possibly have produced 
more endogenous violence to a negotiation and resolution.  
 Ring’s (2006) approach to violence in Karachi may be a better alternative 
than exploring resilience because it incorporates conflict as a phenomenon but 
also attempts to move the system from violence to conflict transformation, 
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similar to Lederach (1995). In Lederach’s conflict transformation literature, he 
describes the attempt to transform the relationships that produce conflict, not 
just manage the outcomes of conflict, which is usually violence. He calls for both 
a short-range and long-range approach to a shock – the shock needs to be 
addressed and resolved while the state works on producing large-scale social 
changes over an extended period of time. As Prendergast points out in Lederach 
(1995) using Rwanda as an example, poorly conceived short-term responses to 
shocks adversely impact the government’s long-term approaches. This short-
run/long-run combination approach is very similar to the theory of economic 
resilience raised in Chapter 2. 
 What does the research of Lederach (1995) and Ring (2006) mean for the 
study of violence in Karachi? Lederach (1995) calls for both external and “insider-
partial” mediators to address conflict. This complements Varshney’s social 
capital approach because it leverages key nodes in social capital networks in the 
city, like the OPP. Further projects employing a social capital approach to 
violence in Karachi can map out social networks and indentify positive and 
negative nodes. How does each node participate in the production of conflict? 
Does each positive node necessarily engage in transforming contentious 
relationships? Does each negative node (gang leaders, political parties) engage in 
Brass (2003)-like practices which intentionally push conflict-producing 
relationships into violence? A social network analysis of violence in Karachi is 
essential in managing and eventually transforming relationships in Karachi from 
violence to conflict resolution.  
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 The next section expands more on how a conflict transformation approach 
should include spatial interventions to complement social capital building. 
6.2 Socio-spatial Capital and Violence 
 The case study of the Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi is an example of the 
important role infrastructure plays in creating “openings” in the wall of chronic 
violence. In Karachi, social, political, and economic, and institutional actors are 
the biggest sources of violence. Given its long history of armed conflict and a 
society fragmented on many lines, any small dispute has the potential to escalate 
into a larger conflict. Because housing and infrastructure provision are major 
problems in Karachi, reducing conflicts related to these sectors can reduce 
economic, social, and institutional violence. 
 The building of infrastructure by the state is the most visible and tangible 
part of the social contract between the state and its citizens. Roads, water lines, 
and sewer lines physically help unite a city, and forge a link between the 
government and its citizens. Using Davis’s (1999) theory of physical, social, and 
political distance here, infrastructure reduces social and political distance in a 
city suffering from massive urban sprawl and may even connect ethnic and 
political distance between factions in the divided city.  
 Connecting different parts of the city to one another is especially 
important. The OPP has been following this tenet with its surveying, mapping, 
and documenting techniques of informal settlements in the city. It provides each 
neighbourhood with maps for the residents to identify developmental goals, 
mobilize, and initiate projects with the state’s help. This interaction between 
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different parts of the city needs to be captured and scaled up, especially in a city 
like Karachi, where ethnic and political enclaves are prevalent. Further research 
is needed on spatial interactions at the sub-city level. How are economic 
relationships in Karachi spatially represented? Where are the hotspots of 
violence and why? Are some towns more prone to exogenous violence? 
Endogenous violence? Violence profiles for each town can identify sources and 
victims of violence in the city. Knowing how different parts of the city interact is 
essential for targeted policymaking and deployment of security forces. Linking 
different parts of the city together, especially informal settlements to the formal 
city, may build unanticipated positive social networks between residents. For 
example, if Lyari were not socially and infrastructurally isolated from the rest of 
the city, would gangs continue to operate in the town? If the KMC and SKAA 
started providing formal services to informal settlements in the city, including 
Lyari, would development-related violence decrease?  Understanding how built 
environment initiatives transform social relationships can further articulate 
Lederach’s (1995) and Ring’s (2006) conflict transformation approach to violence 
in Karachi. 
 The process of infrastructure development and urban planning itself 
(when conducted in a just manner) creates trust in the state or development 
institutions, as demonstrated by the example of the OPP. Fostering a sense of 
ownership over metropolitan space, as opposed to competition that characterizes 
Karachi’s urban crisis, can reinforce citizenship in the physical space of the city, 
not just in the sociopolitical space. The importance of physical citizenship is 
especially crucial in Karachi because of the multiple socioeconomic, religious, 
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and political fault lines. The social networks formed within these fault lines 
usually do not scale up to include other groups or formal institutions. The city-
wide scale of participatory infrastructure provision can help scale up 
concentrated pockets of positive social capital. Major development projects like 
primary sewer and water lines physically transcend ethnic and political enclaves, 
and help unify the physical and social space of the city. To use Varshney’s (2002) 
words, infrastructure provision on a city scale can assume the bridging role of 
civic structures by increasing inter-group engagement. Large-scale infrastructure 
provision can physically unite different parts of Karachi while providing an 
avenue for small-scale social networks to scale up. By being connected to and by 
formal infrastructure, residents can feel like they have ownership over a part of 
Karachi, and that they do not have to constantly fight for a physical and social 
piece of the city. 
 In pursuing urban development, the state can follow the OPP’s 
internal/external concept in order to create both horizontal and vertical social 
capital, and to take reduce the pressure on an already weak government. 
However, in order to do this, mediating state institutions like the KWSB, SKAA, 
and the KMC have to be strengthened and de-politicized. The police in Karachi 
have effectively lost their power because of corruption and their connections to 
various political parties. Just, competent, state urban development agencies are 
the key to creating a more cohesive and accommodating urban space that can 
support the needs of Karachi’s diverse residents.  
 This thesis has attempted to sketch out a relationship between the built 
environment, social networks, and urban violence using the concept of socio-
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spatial capital. While social capital has been very well developed in scholarship, 
literature on spatial capital remains sparse. Spatial capital is useful in the study 
of violence to complement the traditional analyses of socioeconomic networks of 
violence. From the Lyari example, it is evident that the built environment plays 
an important role in creating a space conducive for violent activities, and in the 
Orangi case, it is clear that infrastructure provision has a positive effect in 
reducing violence. Marcus (2007) defines spatial capital as the degree to which 
urban spatial form supports urban social activities. This definition can be further 
expanded to accommodate urban development projects using definitions of 
social capital as a template. For example, does the concept of horizontal and 
vertical capital translate into understanding spatial capital? How can nodes in 
spatial capital be conceptualized and leveraged? Can spatial capital and social 
capital be correlated? The development of the idea of spatial capital can enhance 
one’s understanding of how the built environment and topography can shape 
urban activities.  
 The term ‘urban violence’ is used to describe violence in cities but the 
approaches to urban violence often fail to emphasize the urban nature of 
violence, and mainly focus on the violence part. Urban violence is different from 
general violence because it is enacted in an urban setting, which contains a 
different set of social and spatial relationships from other types of violence, like 
terrorism or rural conflicts. The sheer concentration of different categories of 
violence in a single metropolitan space requires a systemic approach that 
synthesizes socio-economic relationships in the city and the spatial 
characteristics of the urban setting that may induce or resolve conflicts. The 
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larger question the study of chronic violence raises is the practical possibility of 
achieving urban peace. Is it ever possible to articulate one’s right to the city 
without a fist-fight?  
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Appendix 
Fig. 26: Below are more definitions of resilience compiled by Zhou et al. (2009) 
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